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ARGUMENT
Appellee wants to make this case, and Appellant's appeal, about what the experts
have and have not established regarding a structural engineer's duty of reasonable care.
Both the trial court's and Appellee's emphasis on experts and reasonable care is
misplaced. Appellant has appealed the trial court's ruling that granted a once-denied
Motion for Summary Judgment on Appellant's claim for breach of contract. The
admission or denial of expert testimony regarding standard of care, while also important,
is only a minor part of this appeal.
The main issue of this Appeal is the trial court's decision to completely reverse
itself, without basis, and to ignore specific, controverted facts regarding the content,
scope, and meaning of the contract at issue. Such a decision was incorrect, as a trial court
cannot reject genuine issues of material fact and weigh evidence. Appellant's breach of
contract claim does not rely upon any aspect of his expert's testimony, and the trial
court's dismissal of his claim on the basis of inadmissible expert testimony was legally
incorrect.
Appellant does not dispute that he has also appealed the trial court's decision to
bar Plaintiffs expert from testifying at trial. However, the appeal focuses not on the
substance of the decision that the trial court made to bar the expert evidence (because
there is no substantive record of qualifications), but on the procedure that the trial court
followed to reach that decision. Appellant did not have the chance to present the
foundational evidence that would have allowed the trial court to make a substantive
decision on the admissibility of Appellant's expert testimony. The trial court abused its
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
l may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

discretion when it arbitrarily modified the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and prevented
Appellant from providing the trial court with the expert's qualifications. In essence, the
trial court never actually decided whether or not the Appellant's expert was qualified to
testify at trial, because the trial court short-circuited the process established by the Utah
Supreme Court for making such a decision. By disqualifying Appellant's expert prior to
allowing Appellant to even attempt to lay foundation supporting the admissibility of the
expert's testimony, the trial court abused its discretion. This Court must analyze the trial
court's use of its discretion in that procedural decision, for that prefatory decision is the
decision that allowed the trial court to make all of its subsequent rulings regarding
Appellant's expert.
L

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Appellee's contention that Appellant could not prevail on his breach of contract

claim without establishing the relevant standard of care is wrong. As demonstrated in
Appellant's opening brief, a claim for breach of contract does not require the imposition
of any outside, legally-recognized duty or standard of care. When considering a claim for
breach of contract, the parties' obligations to one another flow from the contractual
agreement that the parties themselves made. (See Appellants' Brief at p. 17.) Appellant
has not alleged that Appellee breached a duty of skill or care, but rather that the plans that
Appellee created were deficient, unsuitable, and not compliant with Appellee's
contractual obligation to provide structural engineering plans for construction of
Appellant's building upon Appellant's property. (See R. at 3.)
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Appellee ignores Appellant's argument and simply insists that, without a
competing standard of care from Appellant, there is no dispute that can be raised as to the
scope of the parties' bargain and obligations to one another. Appellee's argument misses
the point. Appellant does not dispute that expert testimony is required to establish a
standard of care; Appellant disputes that he is required, in support of his claim for breach
of contract, to establish a standard of care. No such obligation exists in Utah, and the trial
court erred when it created one.1
A. Opinions that speak to the necessity of establishing a standard of care in
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty cases do not govern inquiries as to disputed
obligations of a contract.
In support of its argument that Appellant was obligated to establish a standard of
care to pursue his breach of contract claim, Appellee relies upon three Utah cases that do
not address, in any way, claims for breach of contract. For example, in Wycalls v.
Guardian Title of Utah, the Court of Appeals analyzed a litigant's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty. 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In Chadwick v. Nielsen, the Court of
Appeals analyzed a litigant's claim for medical malpractice against a doctor. 763 P.2d
817 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Nauman v. HaroldK. Beecher & Assocs., the Utah Supreme
Court also analyzed a litigant's claim for negligence against an architect. 467 P.2d 610
(Utah 1970). To the extent that these three cases speak to the requirement that an expert,
1

Appellee's contention that analysis of the trial court's rejection of the expert testimony
should come before analysis of the trial court's ruling on summary judgment is not
applicable to this case. As stated above (and very clearly throughout Appellant's opening
Brief), the summary judgment decision and the expert testimony decision are different.
The trial court was wrong in both decisions, but that does not somehow make the trial
court's decision regarding summary judgment dependent upon the trial court's decision
regarding expert testimony.
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not a lay witness, provide evidence to establish a standard of care, Appellant does not
dispute their applicability. However, to the extent that Appellee or the trial court relied on
these cases to support a position that Appellant was obligated to establish a standard of
care in this case simply to support any claim for breach of contract, not one of these cases
stands for that proposition.
B. The National Housing case is not instructive, as its facts regarding the breach of
contract claim are far different than the facts in this case.
Appellee's reliance upon National Housing Industries, Inc. v. E.L. Jones
Development, Co., 576 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978), is misplaced, as is Appellee's
contention that this Court favorably adopted the holding within National Housing in
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah. Utah has not adopted National Housing as
authoritative when considering a breach of contract claim. Furthermore, National
Housing did not stand for the proposition that standard of care analysis is required in a
breach of contract claim.
L. Wycalis" § reference to National Housing is not relevant to this case.
That this Court, in Wycalis, positively cited the National Housing case is not
compelling. The Wycalis court simply referentially addressed National Housing in
support of a contention that expert testimony is "helpful in elucidating the standard of
care." 780 P.2d at 826, n. 8. Again, as stated above, Appellant does not dispute this point.
The Wycalis court did not even consider a breach of contract claim anywhere within the
opinion and nowhere did it state that a plaintiff must establish a standard of care in order
to sue an engineer for breach of contract. Despite Appellee's claim, the Wycalis court did
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not cite National Housing favorably for any legal issue or other reason that is relevant to
the issue on appeal.
2L National Housing is inapplicable to this case.
Appellee's explanation and analysis of National Housing is incomplete. Once the
entire case is actually analyzed, it is clear that National Housing is both factually
distinguishable and legally irrelevant to this Court's analysis of this case. As to the facts,
it is imperative to understand that, in National Housing, the plaintiff (National Housing)
was not the party that actually entered into the contract at issue (E.L. Jones Development,
the assignor, was), but rather was an assignee of that contract. 576 P.2d at 1376. National
Housing, as assignee, claimed that the contract always contemplated that the engineer
would include a cut and fill estimate within its original plans, and that by not doing so,
the engineer breached the contract. Id. However, National Housing's argument was
specifically controverted by E.L. Jones Development, the party that actually executed the
contract with the engineer. The president of E.L. Jones Development, who actually
executed the contract, testified at a deposition "that the contract he entered into on behalf
of E.L. Jones Development with the engineer "did not contemplate that the defendant
would prepare cut and fill estimates and that such estimates would not be provided unless
specifically requested." Id. at 1378.
As shown above, in National Housing, both parties to the contract testified,
unequivocally, that no cut and fill estimates were contemplated by the contract. There
was no ambiguity as to the specific terms of the contract, and National Housing, as a
plaintiff, attempted to attack the contract by imposing a superseding duty upon the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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engineer. It was in that context that the court in National Housing analyzed the necessity
of, and required showings for, a standard of care.
Such an exercise is not applicable to this case. Appellant has specifically
controverted Appellee's version of the contract at issue through sworn testimony. In
response to Appellant's position that he never agreed to any version of a page 2, Appellee
presented two different versions of the page 2 to which Appellant purportedly agreed.
Therefore, in this case, unlike in National Housing, the parties that executed the contract
do dispute the contents of the contract, and a genuine issue of fact exists as to the terms
of the parties' agreement within that contract.
Therefore, the factual starting point for the analysis of Appellant's contract claim
is far different than the starting point in National Housing, and for that reason, National
Housing's reliance upon a standard of care analysis is inapposite to the straightforward
breach of contract analysis that faces this Court in this case. Again, as explained in
Appellant's opening Brief, the trial court initially ruled that this dispute regarding the
terms of the contract created an ambiguity that foreclosed Appellee's entitlement to
summary judgment. That ruling by the trial court was the correct ruling, as it reserved, for
the factfinder, the opportunity to determine what contract the parties actually created. For
whatever reason, the trial court later eschewed that viable position and instead created a
herer-to-fore non-existent, overarching requirement that Appellant demonstrate that
Appellee violated a standard of care.
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C Only if a factfinder decides that the disputed page 2 was actually apart of the
contract would the issue of Appellee }s standard of care be relevant.
The contractual issue of an engineer's standard of care will only be relevant if the
factfinder decides that Appellant did, in fact, agree to the terms within some version of
the page 2 of Appellee's standard form contract. This is because it is on that page 2 that
Appellee states that its contractual performance is not subject to any warranty and that its
perfonnance "will be in accordance with a degree of care and skill generally exercised by
professionals performing similar work under similar circumstances." (R. at 148.)
However, as explained above, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or
not page 2 is part of the contract. If it is not part of the contract, then the standard of care
analysis is irrelevant. The trial court was not entitled to overlook the ambiguities of the
contract and unilaterally decide that page 2 was, in fact, part of the contract.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO NOT ALLOW APPELLANT TO
PROFFER THE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HIS
EXPERT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The trial court's decision to bar Appellant's expert from testifying without

allowing Appellant the chance to lay any foundation for the admissibility of that expert's
testimony was unjustified and unsupportable. Despite clear procedural rules that gave
Appellant the right to respond to the Motion in Limine and case law that laid out the
exact process that the trial court should follow when deciding whether an expert was
qualified, the trial court neither followed the procedural rules nor the process for deciding
whether Appellant's expert was qualified to testify. The trial court cut Appellant off from
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the opportunity to present foundational evidence that, under Utah law, he was required,
and entitled, to present.
A. The trial court's decision to shorten the briefing timeframe without giving prior
notice was an abuse of discretion and it substantially affected the outcome of the
proceedings.
The trial court's decision to shorten the briefing time led the trial court to declare
that it believed that Appellee's Motion in Limine was unopposed. (R. at 713.) The trial
court then soon after not only granted the Motion in Limine as unopposed, but reopened,
sua sponte, a previously denied Motion for Summary Judgment and reversed its decision.
To claim that the trial court's decision to shorten the briefing time and consider
Appellee's Motion unopposed was inconsequential is not at all accurate. The trial court's
decision regarding the "unopposed" Motion in Limine precipitated every other incorrect
ruling that the trial court made. For the reasons elucidated in the initial Brief, the trial
court did, in fact, abuse its discretion when it shortened Appellant's time to respond to
the Motion in Limine. That decision was not inconsequential, and it certainly affected the
outcome of Appellant's case. It should be reversed.
B. The trial court's decision to bar admission of Appellant's expert's testimony
without allowing Appellant to proffer his qualifications was an abuse of
discretion.
Mr. Nordquist, the Appellant's expert, did elucidate a standard of care within his
report and during his deposition. (R. at 53-69, 271, 323; see Appellant's Brief at pp. 1920.) The trial court disregarded this opinion, and refused to allow Appellant to even
officially proffer foundation in support of Mr. Nordquist's qualifications to give
testimony as to Appellee's standard of care.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Mr. Nordquist opined about a standard of care that applies to all engineers,
regardless of their specialty. (R. at 271.) By ruling at the time and in the manner that it
did, the trial court did not allow Appellant any opportunity even to attempt to lay the
necessary foundation to satisfy the requirements that the Utah Supreme Court elucidated
in Boice v. Marble. 1999 UT 71, f 14, 982 P.2d 565 (stating that an expert can testify
outside of his or her specialty if the foundation laid by the party presenting the expert
establishes that the standards of care observed by the two specialties are the same and
that the expert has the independent knowledge regarding the other specialty's standard of
care). (See also Appellee's Brief at 21.) There is no way for this Court to evaluate the
trial court's substantive decision regarding the admissibility of Mr. Nordquist's opinion
because the trial court prematurely terminated the process of establishing Mr. Nordquist's
credentials. This Court cannot decide whether or not Mr. Nordquist was qualified to
testify, because Appellant had no chance even to create a record of Mr. Nordquist's
specific qualifications.
Appellee's claim that Mr. Nordquist was not qualified to provide expert testimony
regarding Appellee's standard of care is just as unsupportable, because Appellee can only
rely upon Mr. Nordquist's status as a geotechnical, rather than a structural, engineer. (See
Appellee's Brief at p. 21.) As demonstrated in Boice, simply asserting that an expert does
not share the same specialty as the subject of the expert testimony is not sufficient to
justify disqualification of the expert. 1999 UT 71, f 14. Therefore, Appellee's contention
that "Ross failed to make the threshold showing of competency required by Utah Rule of
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Evidence 702" (Appellee's Brief at p. 23) has no basis, because Appellant was never
given the chance to make such a threshold showing.
CONCLUSION
Genuine issues of material fact exist that precluded the trial court from entering
summary judgment against Appellant. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion
when it barred Plaintiff from introducing Mr. Nordquist's expert testimony at trial. The
Court should reverse the trial court's rulings.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of January 2012.
HILL^QffiTSC^ & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

Stephen Quesenberry
Aaron R. Harris
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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